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LOSS OF PROTECTION AS INJURY IN FACT:




As currently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
Article III of the Constitution creates a significant hurdle for
plaintiff citizen groups seeking standing to challenge environmen-
tal planning or management decisions. In particular, plaintiffs
have had difficulty in making the required showing of an 'injury
in fact" where an agency has not yet approved a site-specific
action but has approved only a general plan for an area to govern
future site-specific actions. The Supreme Court has not articulat-
ed a clear rule for standing to challenge the latter type of agency
decision making, and the courts of appeals for the various circuits
appear to disagree as to the effect of Supreme Court decisions
that have touched on the issue. This Note argues that an agency
planning or management decision that amounts to a loss of pro-
tection for a once-protected natural area should constitute a judi-
cially cognizable injury and demonstrates how the Supreme
Court, in other contexts, has recognized theoretically similar and
less concrete injuries as sufficient to establish standing.
INTRODUCTION
Citizen suits by environmental groups against government
agencies have met with many obstacles in the federal courts.
Among the most significant legal obstacles to some of these
citizen suits are the court-created standards for determining
a party's standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution. Current standing jurisprudence requires that a
plaintiff challenging a governmental agency action show an
actual or imminent injury in fact, a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the allegedly unlawful action, and that
a favorable decision is likely to redress that injury.' In addi-
tion, the Administrative Procedure Act2 (APA) requires that,
* Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
29, 1996. B.A. 1990, The Evergreen State College; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan
Law School. I am grateful to Rebecca Rokos for her helpful edits.
1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
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in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, an agency
action must be final to be reviewable3 and that the harm
alleged be "within the meaning of a relevant statute."
These requirements have presented unique difficulties to
plaintiffs attempting to challenge broad agency planning
decisions regarding natural resources and the environment.5
For example, it is difficult for citizen groups to show that
they have, or will be, injured in fact by an agency decision
where it is the environment, not the group, that is the object
of the decision or regulation.6 Thus, courts have required
citizen groups to allege that their individual members use the
area affected by the proposed agency decision.7 Courts also
may deny standing to plaintiffs who have alleged a threat-
ened harm but have not shown that the harm is imminent8 or
that the agency action is the cause of the anticipated injury.9
As with the injury-in-fact requirement, showing causation
and redressability is particularly difficult where the claimed
injury results from the allegedly unlawful regulation by an-
other party, so that it is really the acts of that third party
3. Id. § 704.
4. Id. § 702.
5. This Note deals primarily with challenges alleging violations of either the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994), the Forest and
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994), or
both.
6. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (opining
that when the plaintiff is not the object of the challenged action or inaction, estab-
lishing standing is "substantially more difficult") (citation omitted); Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 886-88 (1990) (finding affidavits filed by wildlife
group members complaining that agency action affected recreational use and
enjoyment of land in the vicinity insufficient to show that their interests were
affected for purposes of the APA); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)
(holding that an organization's interest in an issue such as environmental protec-
tion is, by itself, insufficient to render the organization adversely affected within
the meaning of the APA); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to find an injury in fact in the Department of Agriculture's adoption of a
national forest plan as its adoption did not effectuate on-the-ground environmental
changes, nor did the plan dictate site-specific action).
7. Morton, 405 U.S. at 735.
8. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 (holding that "some day"
intentions without concrete plans to visit the area affected by the proposed govern-
ment action are insufficient to support a finding of actual or imminent injury).
9. See id. at 568 (finding that challenges to particular programs that agencies
establish to carry out their legal obligations, as opposed to challenges to identifiable
government violations of law, are rarely appropriate for adjudication). When the
agency action has not caused the injury, it follows that the harm cannot be re-
dressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 571.
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that threaten the plaintiff with harm.' ° Similarly, plaintiffs
have encountered difficulty with the final-agency-action re-
quirement of the APA where, for example, further steps must
be taken before a stand of timber is finally harvested."
These challenges become more formidable as the agency
decision at issue becomes more general in scope and effect.
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled explicitly on the
issue, one court even has suggested that broad planning deci-
sions affecting the environment are never reviewable absent
a site-specific action.'2 Where the alleged injury caused by an
agency action has been indirect or vague, one strategy plaintiff
citizen groups have used has been to characterize an injury as
procedural, 3 such as when an agency has allegedly failed to
prepare an environmental impact statement. 14 Another ap-
proach suggested by some scholars is to rewrite citizen suit
provisions such that a cash bounty is awarded to successful
plaintiffs and thus the loss of the bounty itself becomes a
threatened injury in fact.'5 Both of these approaches are
limited. A more comprehensive and coherent approach would
be to reconsider the nature of the injury caused by agency
planning decisions such that the loss of protection resulting
from a planning decision is seen as an injury in itself. This
concept is not foreign to some courts, and the Supreme Court
has recognized similar types of injuries in analogous cases.
This Note begins by briefly summarizing the relevant recent
history of standing law in Part I, focusing in particular on the
two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation (NWF)6 and Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife.' Part II compares recent United States court of
appeals cases that have ruled on the question of standing in
cases challenging broad environmental planning decisions and
10. See id. at 562.
11. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1994).
12. Id.
13. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 1988). For
a detailed outline of this approach, see Note, Standing for Environmental Groups:
Procedural Injury as Injury-in-Fact, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163 (1992).
14. See Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1986).
15. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, "Inju-
ries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 232 (1992). For a variation on the bounty
approach, see Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: The Effect of Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife and the Role of Citizen Suits in Environmental Enforcement, 19 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 141 (1994).
16. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
17. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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have reached opposite conclusions. Part III first argues that
ecological, administrative, and common sense considerations
support opening environmental planning decisions to judicial
review before any site-specific action. Part III then addresses
the difficulties encountered by citizen groups seeking judicial
review of environmental planning decisions by proposing a
new understanding of "injury in fact." This proposed under-
standing draws support from analogous United States Su-
preme Court decisions, as well as from an aspect of the case
of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 8
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STANDING
The basic question underlying any standing inquiry is
simply whether or not a particular plaintiff has a right to sue
for enforcement of an alleged legal duty. Although this has
always been at least an implicit question for the courts, a
separate standing doctrine did not develop until the 1920s and
1930s, when the rapid growth of the administrative state
presented the courts with the problem of deciding who could
sue to enforce the duties of the new government agencies. 19
Early standing law was therefore a means whereby the courts
either could insulate agencies from, or expose them to, chal-
lenges by private citizens. Supporting greater access to the
courts was the notion that citizens might serve as private
attorneys general by suing agencies in the name of the public
interest.2 0 Supporting more limited access to the courts was
the notion that individuals should not be permitted to enlist
the judiciary to intervene in the essentially democratic pro-
cesses of legislation and administration.2' The basic rule that
18. 438 U.S. 912 (1978).
19. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 179 (noting that in an effort to protect New
Deal legislation from frequent judicial intervention, Justices Brandeis and Frank-
furter developed a range of standing limits).
20. E.g., Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Con-
gress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official person ...
authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory
powers. ... Such persons.., are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.") (footnote
omitted), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
21. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 179-80. This concern with the separation of
powers remains central to questions of standing today. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
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emerged from the early standing decisions was that a plain-
tiff's right to sue depended on the existence of a particular
common law or statutory right.22 Thus, courts largely rejected
constitutional claims brought by citizens.23
The APA did little to change standing doctrine. The APA
provided that proper plaintiffs were those suffering a "legal
wrong... or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute."24 This was meant
to be a restatement of existing law rather than an addition to
it.
25
In the 1960s and 1970s, another period of dramatic growth
for the regulatory state, the APA's "legal wrong" language was
used to open the courts to claims by the beneficiaries of agency
actions rather than just by the regulated parties themselves.
During this period, the notion of private citizens acting as
attorneys general was revived,26 and many of the regulatory
statutes enacted in this time included citizen suit provisions.27
During this period, the Supreme Court even granted standing
to a group of taxpayers who asserted a vague constitutional
challenge to a federal program authorizing grants for teaching
materials in religious schools,28 a claim quite similar to those
for which the Court had previously denied standing.29
It was not until 1970, in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp (ADP),30 that the injury-in-fact
22. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137
(1939).
23. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923) (holding that
a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal
appropriations act).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
25. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 181 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 96 (1947)).
26. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1003-04, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that the FCC must allow standing
to citizens representing the listening public to challenge the renewal of a broadcast
license).
27. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 192-93. Citizen suit provisions were particu-
larly common in environmental statutes. Id. at 193. Sunstein also notes that "[elvery
major environmental statute except [the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act] authorizes a citizen suit." Id. at 165 n.11.
28. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
29. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923) (denying
standing to a taxpayer challenging federal appropriations to assist states in improv-
ing maternal and infant mortality rates and in protecting the health of mothers and
infants).
30. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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requirement was introduced.3 1 Since ADP, the courts have re-
garded injury-in-fact as an essential element of establishing
standing under Article III.32 Even where Congress, by statute,
has explicitly granted broad power to citizens to challenge
agency actions, the Supreme Court has ruled that the injury-
in-fact requirement is a constitutional prerequisite and cannot
be waived.33
The Court has recognized less concrete injuries, such as
harm to recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of a natural area
or a particular species.34 The Court also has recognized alleged
injuries potentially resulting from quite attenuated chains of
causation, as in United States v. Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).35 SCRAP claimed that in-
creased railroad freight charges would disproportionately raise
the cost of recycled goods compared to those made from raw
materials, thereby increasing the amount of litter in and
around the area in which they lived.36 SCRAP is an extreme
example, one which the Court would rather ignore," but it is
nonetheless an example of how willing the Court has been
about to allow standing where plaintiffs can show a cognizable
injury in fact.
31. Under ADP, rather than showing harm to a "legal interest," a test that "goes
to the merits," id. at 153, a plaintiff need only show that an "injury in fact, economic
or otherwise," exists. Id. at 152. The suit was brought by a company that provided
data processing services against the Comptroller of the Currency and a national
bank, challenging the Comptroller's ruling allowing banks to provide data processing
services to other banks and banking customers. Id. at 151. Although the plaintiffs
were affected indirectly by the Comptroller's ruling, they were not among the
regulated parties. See id. In finding that standing was established by the economic
injury that the plaintiffs might suffer as a result of increased competition from
banks, the Court apparently sought to simplify and liberalize standing requirements.
See id. at 154. The Court noted that the decision was consistent with the trend
toward enlarging the class of those who had standing to challenge agency actions. Id.
32. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
33. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-73 (1992). The Court
rejected the view that the injury-in-fact requirement was satisfied by the Endangered
Species Act's provision that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf." Id. at 571-72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).
34. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 US. 221, 230
n.4 (1986) (noting that a potential threat to plaintiffs' opportunities for whale-
watching is an injury in fact); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972)
(recognizing potential harm to a plaintiffs individual interest in recreational use of
a natural area as an injury in fact).
35. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
36. Id. at 675-76.
37. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (dismiss-
ing the SCRAP opinion as one "whose expansive expression of what would suffice for
§ 702 review ... has never since been emulated by this Court").
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Although the injury-in-fact requirement originally may have
been intended to create easier access to the courts, courts have
used it more recently to keep plaintiffs with otherwise valid
claims out of court, especially in cases involving environmental
law. In Sierra Club v. Morton,38 the Supreme Court denied
standing to an environmental group seeking to enjoin con-
struction of a ski resort in the Sierra Nevada mountains
because the group did not allege that any of its members
actually used the area where the resort was to be built.39
Although the decision did not create a prohibitively high barri-
er to suits by environmental groups, it is clear that such
groups now must find individual members to submit affidavits
claiming that they regularly use, have used, and plan to
continue to use the particular area in question.4"
The more recent cases of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife41 and
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (NWF)42 have presented
more difficulty for environmental groups. In NWF, the
plaintiffs sought to challenge a decision by the Bureau of Land
Management to reclassify vast tracts of protected, or "with-
drawn," land so as to open the tracts to multiple uses, includ-
ing surface mining and oil and gas leasing.43 Both affidavits
filed to establish standing alleged that the plaintiffs used
areas "in the vicinity" of two different portions of the reclas-
sified land, one consisting of 4500 acres and the other approxi-
mately 5.5 million acres.44 The Court found that standing was
not established by "averments which state[d] only that one of
respondent's members use[d] unspecified portions of an im-
mense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining
activity ha[d] occurred or probably w[ould] occur by virtue of
the governmental action."45
38. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
39. See id. at 734-35. The case apparently was meant to test the limits of what
constitutes injury in fact, for it is suggested in a footnote that some of the group's
members actually did use the area, but the group nonetheless chose to rely solely on
its more abstract interest in preserving natural areas in general. See id. at 735 n.8.
40. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Morton subsequently were allowed to establish
standing by amending their complaint with further allegations concerning standing
and adding certain additional parties. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219,
220 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
41. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
42. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
43. Id. at 879.
44. Id. at 886-87.
45. Id. at 889 (emphasis added). Note that the court was applying summary
judgment standards and therefore was not willing to rely on conclusory allegations
864 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:3
Thus the Court conceded that mining had occurred or prob-
ably would occur in the areas at issue. The fatal flaw in the
plaintiffs' allegations was that they did not show that the spe-
cific sites where mining had occurred or would occur were the
very ones that the affiants claimed to use.46 Such a showing
probably would have been impossible to make, as it would
require, in part, a prediction of where future mining rights
would be sold. Perhaps this is why the affidavits used the
language, "in the vicinity." In finding such language insuffi-
cient, even when a large area is at issue, the Court seems to
have precluded all but site-specific complaints regarding use
of the environment. As long as the Court understands injury
to mean the actual mining of a particular area rather than the
threat or eventual likelihood of mining in a large area, stand-
ing will be difficult to establish because it will be impossible
for a plaintiff to plead with any more specificity than "in the
vicinity" until those operations actually exist or, at least, until
the mining rights have been sold.
Two years after NWF, Defenders of Wildlife47 established
that an express grant by Congress of a right to challenge an
agency action does not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.48
The case also elaborated on the specificity of facts required to
establish injury in fact. Defenders of Wildlife involved a chal-
lenge to the Department of the Interior's interpretation of the
Endangered Species Act as not applying to government actions
overseas. 49 The alleged injury was that several overseas con-
struction projects, with which the United States was involved,
threatened to increase the rate of extinction of certain endan-
gered species." The plaintiff environmental group submitted
affidavits from members who claimed to have visited the
construction sites to view the endangered species in the past
and also claimed an intent to return to those sites to view
those species again.5' The Court held that
an "inten[t]" to return to the places they had visited before
... is simply not enough. Such "some day" inten-
tions-without any description of concrete plans, or indeed
that the affiants used the affected lands but rather required a sworn averment that
the affiants in fact used those specific lands. Id. at 888-89.
46. Id. at 886-89.
47. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
48. Id. at 573.
49. Id. at 557-58.
50. Id. at 562.
51. Id. at 563-64.
SPRING 1996] Standing and Environmental Planning Decisions 865
even any specification of when the some day will be--do
not support a finding of the "actual or imminent" injury
that our cases require.52
This was true even where, as here, the relevant statute pro-
vided that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf" to enjoin or compel agency action.53
In Defenders of Wildlife, the nature of the injury that the
Court contemplated was again narrow and specific. The threat
of an increased rate of extinction of various species resulting
from government activities was not enough; nor would the
actual extinction of the species, in itself, constitute injury in
fact by the Court's reasoning. The Court seemed to require
that certain individuals would likely witness the actual extinc-
tion of one or more species. Indeed, the Court indicated that
the outcome might have been different if the plaintiffs had
produced plane tickets in support of their alleged intent to
return to the countries in question.54
A standing test that can make the existence of a case or
controversy depend on the purchase of an airline ticket cer-
tainly has the potential to miss the point. Although the unique
facts of Defenders of Wildlife make it easily distinguishable
and therefore not, on its facts, a great hurdle for environmen-
tal groups seeking standing, it demonstrates the high degree
of specificity required to establish injury in fact and provides
an example of how ill-suited the test can be for determining
what types of claims are properly decided by the courts.
II. RECENT CASES REGARDING STANDING TO CHALLENGE
BROAD AGENCY PLANNING DECISIONS
Lower courts' interpretations ofNWF and Defenders of Wild-
life have had a profound effect on court access afforded to
citizens seeking to challenge agency decisions regarding the
environment. Of particular concern here are the consequences
that those cases have had for plaintiffs seeking to challenge
the broad planning decisions of environmental agencies before
52. Id. at 564.
53. Endangered Species Act, 16 US.C. § 1540(g) (1994) (emphasis added).
54. 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
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those decisions have manifested themselves. in site-specific
actions such as timber sales.
A. The Eighth Circuit: Sierra Club v. Robertson
In Sierra Club v. Robertson,55 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit held that, under NWF and De-
fenders of Wildlife, a plaintiff environmental group has no
standing to challenge a United States Forest Service Land and
Resource Management Plan (LRMP), except when challenging
a specific timber sale.56 The court cast its decision in such
broad terms that the holding went beyond the facts and estab-
lished a basic rule for the Eighth Circuit.57 The LRMP at issue
set forth guidelines and principles for the Forest Service to
follow in making site-specific decisions for approximately 1.6
million acres of land.5" The decision did not state precisely
what effect the LRMP would have had in terms of the volume
of timber that would be sold for harvest under the LRMP's
guidelines. By the court's reasoning, even if the LRMP opened
the entire 1.6 million acres to timber harvesting where before
it had all been protected, and even if the Sierra Club could
establish that its members regularly used the entire area, the
Sierra Club would not have been able to allege that the LRMP
amounted to an injury in fact because, according to the court,
"[tihe mere existence of [an LRMP does not produce an immi-
nent injury in fact."59
55. 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).
56. See id. at 758-60.
57. Id. at 759 ("Standing thus can accrue only when the 'factual components [are]
fleshed out . . . by some concrete action .... '") (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)). The decision, a direct response to Defenders of
Wildlife and NWF, see id. at 758-59, was reached by the same court that had found
standing for the plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife before it reached the Supreme
Court. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub
noma. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
58. 28 F.3d at 755.
59. Id. at 758. The court reasoned:
Adoption of the [LRMP] does not effectuate any on-the-ground environmental
changes.... [Blefore an environmental change can come about, ... a site-
specific action (e.g., a timber sale) must be proposed and found to be consistent
with the Plan.... Finding an environmental injury based on the [LRMP] alone,
without reference to a particular site-specific action, would "take[ I us into the
area of speculation and conjecture."
SPRING 19961 Standing and Environmental Planning Decisions 867
By the Robertson court's reasoning, the nature of a manage-
ment plan and its implications are of no relevance. It is not
until tracts of timber are actually proposed for sale that a
plaintiff can claim injury. Even then, according to the Eighth
Circuit, the plan driving the timber sales would be immune
from attack. G°
The Supreme Court has not addressed directly whether
plaintiffs have standing to challenge an LRMP,6" but the
Robertson court is correct that its reasoning is consistent with
NWF. The LRMP at issue in Robertson was similar to the
reclassification decisions at issue in NWF. Both agency actions
subjected large areas of land to potential uses to which they
had not been subjected previously without compelling any
particular future site-specific action.62 The Supreme Court
stopped short of holding that a plaintiff can never challenge a
broad management plan, limiting its discussion instead to the
facts of the case and the inadequacy of the language, "in the
vicinity." However, it seems likely that, given the Court's
understanding of "injury" in this context, Robertson would be
affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal.
The Eighth Circuit's approach also draws support from
Defenders of Wildlife. In discussing the causation and
redressability requirements in Defenders of Wildlife, the
Supreme Court explained that the level of certainty required
when showing injury is much higher when the injury ulti-
mately "'depends on the unfettered choices made by indepen-
dent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of...
discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to
Id. (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974), vacated sub nom. Sponer
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974)).
60. Id. at 759. The court found that when a site-specific action eventually was
proposed the plaintiffs could assert only "that the proposed site-specific action is not
consistent with the [LRMPJ, or that the [LRMP] as it relates to the proposed site-
specific action is inconsistent with the governing statutes, or both." Id.
61. Id. at 758. The NWF Court did hold that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
make a wholesale challenge to the ongoing "land withdrawal review program"
because the program did not amount to an agency action, much less a final agency
action, as required by the APA. NWF, 497 U.S. at 890. The program guided specific
reclassification decisions, however. See id. at 877-79 (describing the program).
Therefore the program was much broader in scope and effect than the reclassification
decisions made under it. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46 (discussing
plaintiffs' challenge to the reclassification decisions).
62. See Robertson, 28 F.3d at 759. The court noted that the appellants' situation
was very similar to that of the plaintiffs in NWF. The appellants in Robertson,
however, mounted a facial attack on the LRMP, not as in NWF, on its application.
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predict.' ,63 Thus, when an agency decision merely has made
possible-or even likely-the actions of third parties such as
timber harvesters or mining companies who will ultimately
cause environmental damage, standing is "'substantially more
difficult' to establish."
64
B. The Ninth C'rcuit: Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma
and Its Progeny
The Ninth Circuit has developed a broader and more realis-
tic concept of what constitutes injury in the context of envi-
ronmental agency planning decisions. The 1991 case of Idaho
Conservation League v. Mumma 65 provides the precedent for
most of the circuit's decisions in this area. Similar to Sierra
Club v. Robertson,66 the case involved a challenge to an agency
plan for managing more than two million acres of national for-
est.6 7 In particular, the plaintiffs challenged the forest ser-
vice's decision, pursuant to the plan, to sacrifice certain areas
of roadless land in order to allow timber harvesting. 68 The
plan opened the affected land to uses to which it had not been
subject before without dictating any particular future site-
specific action. 69 Unlike Robertson, however, the Idaho Con-
servation League court found that the plaintiff environmental
group had standing to bring such a claim.7 ° In reaching its
decision, the court employed a variety of rationales, without
articulating in great detail any one of them.
1. Procedural Injury-First, the court discussed procedural
injury. Because the National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA) "'is essentially a procedural statute designed to en-
sure that environmental issues are given proper consideration
in the decision making process,' ,,71 the court concluded that an
63. 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615
(1989)).
64. Id. at 562 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)).
65. 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
66. 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994). For further discussion of the facts of Robertson,
see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
67. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1511.
68. Id. at 1512.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1518.
71. Id. at 1514 (quoting Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
868
SPRING 1996] Standing and Environmental Planning Decisions 869
alleged injury resulting from the violation of a statutorily
mandated procedure confers standing. 2 Specifically, the injury
caused by the violation of the procedural right was the possi-
bility that certain environmental consequences would be
overlooked. 73 Such an approach is essentially merit-based, as
it looks to the nature of the claim in light of the relevant
statute. The approach derives support from the "zone of in-
terests" test set forth by the Supreme Court in Association of
Data Processing Organizations v. Camp (ADP),74 as well as
from the APA, which requires that a plaintiff be aggrieved
"within the meaning of a relevant statute., 7' But the approach
does not address adequately the injury-in-fact requirement as
established by the Supreme Court. The Court in Defenders of
Wildlife did acknowledge that, a person living next to a pro-
posed dam site would have standing to challenge an agency's
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement with
respect to construction of the dam.76 The assertion by an
environmental group that a forest plan creates a risk that
environmental consequences will be overlooked, however, does
not present the same degree of specificity or imminence.77
2. Threatened Harm and Causation-The court in Idaho
Conservation League next focused on the threatened harm of
future logging activity.78 Certainly actual logging in an area
would amount to an injury in fact to those who use the area.
In the context of challenging a management plan, it is the
intermediate steps and contingencies that come between the
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1511.
74. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). For further discussion of ADP, see supra notes
30-31 and accompanying text.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). The Idaho Conservation League court also cited
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221,264-65(1988), who
argued that the injury-in-fact requirement should be abandoned in favor of a merit-
based approach that considers the purpose of the underlying statute. 956 F.2d at
1513 n.10.
76. 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
77. In addition, the procedural injury approach is of no use in cases where an
agency has followed the proper procedure in reaching a decision, but where the
decision is alleged to be unlawful because the alleged injury is substantive rather
than procedural. The APA allows judicial intervention not only in the event of
procedural violations but also, for example, when an agency decision is found to be
"arbitrary [or] capricious," or "in excess of statutory ... authority." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A), (C) (1994). Thus, the procedural injury approach is, at best, limited in
scope.
78. 956 F.2d at 1515.
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approval of a plan and the actual logging that present a
potential problem for standing. These contingencies make it
difficult to show a causal connection between the plan and the
ultimate injury. The court dealt with the problem first by
focusing on the nature of the threat of injury. Noting that an
injury in fact may be threatened rather than actual, the court
concluded that the fact "that the potential injury would be the
result of a chain of events need not doom the standing
claim."79 Here, the court suggested that the threat was suffi-
ciently strong, although it seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court would agree.8 °
A stronger point was that third-party developers "could not
undertake their future actions but for the challenged deci-
sion. " " But those third parties nonetheless could choose not to
develop. That is, even though the "'potential... development
activity of third parties on [affected] lands ... is a direct result
of the [agency's] action,'"82 that development is only potential
in the absence of a proposed, site-specific development.
3. Final Agency Action-As for the APA's final-agency-
action requirement, 83 the court concluded that "the initial plan
and wilderness recommendation represent important deci-
sions. " " Clearly this is not enough; importance is not finality.
However, the court also suggested that, insofar as the man-
agement of the area in question is concerned, the plan is a
final decision." This makes sense. An agency charged with
managing an area will always have additional decisions to
make regarding that area. Just as a timber sale represents a
final decision causing injury on one level, the final adoption of
a plan designating the whole area in a particular way also
should be considered final, as there are no more steps to be
taken in deciding how the area is to be used.
79. Id.
80. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 ("Although imminence is
concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose,
which is to ensure that the alleged injury is ...certainly impending.") (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted));
id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing that the "'injury must be both real and
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical'") (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
81. 956 F.2d at 1518.
82. Id. at 1518 n.19. (quoting Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 315 (E.D.
Cal. 1985)).
83. See supra notes 3, 11 and accompanying text.
84. 956 F.2d at 1516.
85. Id. at 1519.
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4. The Problem with "In the Vicinity"--The Idaho Conser-
vation League court also attempted to solve the problem that
the plaintiffs in NWF86 faced in pleading use of areas "in the
vicinity" of the land affected by agency action. 7 The court
distinguished NWF by pointing out that the plaintiffs in the
instant case had alleged use of specific areas within the area
affected by the plan.88 This distinction is tenuous, as one
easily could argue that the plaintiffs had not shown that the
areas that they used were the same ones that would be af-
fected. 9 The court was sympathetic to the fact that "[blecause
no development has yet been authorized, plaintiffs cannot
provide any more detail than they have."90 The court ad-
dressed this problem by reasoning that, "[tlo the extent that
the threat of development in one specific area is sufficient...
a similar threat to a number of specified areas also must
suffice." 91 The court again emphasized the threat, but, as
noted above, the threat of logging in several particular areas
probably is not enough to pass muster by Supreme Court
standards.92
5. The Plan as Injury in Fact-Laced into the court's
discussion about the threatened harm and the relative finality
and causal effect of the agency action is a unique recognition
of a very real form of injury not commonly considered by the
courts in this context. The court noted that "the Service's
decision is harmful for standing purposes" because it made
possible development that otherwise would have been pre-
vented.93 Decisions making development possible "are injuries
that we must deem immediate, not speculative. Indeed, short
of assuming that Congress imposed useless procedural safe-
guards, and that wilderness designation is a superfluous step,
we must conclude that the management plan plays some, if
not a critical, part in subsequent decisions." 4
86. 497 U.S. 871, 880 (1990).
87. 956 F.2d at 1517.
88. Id.
89. This is perhaps why the plaintiffs in NWF pleaded use of land "in the
vicinity" in the first place.
90. 956 F.2d at 1517. Note that the same thing could have been said on behalf
of the plaintiffs in NWF.
91. Id.
92. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
93. 956 F.2d at 1516 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
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Thus the court recognized the obvious fact that the plan
drove future site-specific actions by making them possible.
Indeed, the plan seemed to make at least some logging activity
all but inevitable where before it had been precluded. The
plan, therefore, took protection away from an area. Unless
such protection-which included the procedural safeguards
created by Congress-was worthless to begin with, the loss of
it was harmful. Therefore, "[to the extent that the plan pre-
determine[d] the future, it represent[ed] a concrete injury."9
6. Subsequent Cases-With varying degrees of clarity, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has fol-
lowed the approach of Idaho Conservation League.96 In some
of these cases, the court has distinguished Defenders and
NWF.9 7 In Resources Ltd. v. Robertson,9" however, the court
explicitly rejected the argument that Defenders of Wildlife and
95. Id.
96. For example, in Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705,707-08(9th
Cir. 1993), the court granted standing to a plaintiff environmental group challenging
a timber management plan. The plaintiffs claimed that the Forest Service violated
the NEPA with its decision not to supplement the plan's Environmental Impact
Statement in light of new evidence regarding the potential impact of logging on the
spotted owl, an endangered species. Id. at 707. The court reasoned that the existence
of the spotted owl was linked to the existence of the forest, that the management plan
drove the location and volume of future timber sales such that timber that otherwise
might have been protected now would be sold, and that, therefore, the plan itself
represented an injury. Id. at 708. See also Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying the same reasoning to similar facts).
The court in Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir.
1994), relied more on the procedural injury approach. In that case, the plaintiffs
challenged a region's vegetation management policy under the NEPA. Id. at 1348. The
court found sufficient for standing purposes the allegation that an agency's failure
to follow the procedures mandated by the NEPA would lead to the possibility that
environmental consequences, which the NEPA requires agencies to consider, would
be overlooked. Id. at 1355. The court actually quoted Defenders of Wildlife in support
of its approach, noting that "plaintiffs who are 'seeking to enforce a procedural
requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs'
have standing." Id. at 1355 n.14 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 594 U.S. at 572). The
Supreme Court probably would not approve of this application. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
97. E.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993). The court
distinguished Defenders of Wildlife on the ground that the plaintiffs could not prove
imminent or actual injury because they were unable to state when, or even if, they
would return to the construction sites and distinguished NWF on the grounds that
the agency action in that case was not final. Id. at 702-03. It is difficult to see how
the specific reclassification decisions in NWF were any less final than the actions in
the instant case. Perhaps this is why the court focused on the "land withdrawal review
program" at issue in NWF, as opposed to the more specific reclassification decisions
that were also at issue. See id.; supra note 61 (discussing the reclassification decisions
and the "land withdrawal review program" in NWF).
98. 35 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1993).
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NWF had done anything to change the standing requirements
in the Ninth Circuit.99 Resources is nearly identical on its facts
to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Sierra Club v. Robertson,'00 which reached the opposite con-
clusion as to the effect of Defenders of Wildlife and NWF.'0'
Like Robertson, Resources involved a challenge to a forest-wide
LRMP. °2 The court reasoned that the LRMP pre-determined
the future because it drove individual timber sales, that the
plaintiffs challenge was to the overall plan, and that therefore
the time to bring such a challenge was the present." 3 The
court considered irrelevant the events that might intervene
between the adoption of the plan and an actual timber sale.0 4
Thus, the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
are in direct conflict on this issue.
III. THE Loss OF PROTECTION AS INJURY IN FACT
As outlined above, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has displayed an eclectic approach in confer-
ring standing to citizen groups challenging broad environ-
mental planning decisions by government agencies.'0 5 The
court has employed the concept of procedural injury, focused
on the threat of future site-specific actions, and attempted to
characterize planning decisions as injuries in themselves. It is
this third approach that is of interest here and that this Note
will develop and clarify. First, however, it is necessary to say
something about why standing doctrine should be liberalized
in this arena in the first place.
99. Id. at 1303. The court pointed out that, in fact, Idaho Conservation League
was decided after NWF. Id.
100. 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).
101. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
102. 35 F.3d at 1302.
103. Id. at 1303-04.
104. Id. at 1303.
105. Supra Part II.B.
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A. Why a Management Plan Should Be Open to Challenge
1. Keeping Agencies Accountable-To find the approach
suggested in this Note desirable, one must start by accepting
the proposition that citizen suits can serve and have served a
useful and positive function. Since the early days of the ad-
ministrative state, citizen suits have been valued for allowing
private persons to help monitor the activities of government
agencies.' °6 As such, citizen suits serve to keep government
more accountable to regulated parties, as well as to the real or
potential beneficiaries of regulation, by forcing agencies to
comply with the will of Congress. 10 7 Citizen suits also can
conserve government resources, including the resources of the
agencies themselves, by providing another forum where pri-
vate parties may bring their own resources and knowledge to
bear on important decisions.' 8 Ideally, then, citizen suits do
not hinder the executive branch in performing its functions;
rather, they help the executive branch to do its job better and
they provide an additional safeguard to ensure that it does so
responsibly.
2. Supplying Information-In the area of environmental
law, citizen suits may be uniquely valuable insofar as they
bring additional research and information to the decision-
making process. Ecology, as opposed to environmentalism,
which describes an essentially political phenomenon, is scien-
tific in nature. As such, it depends on research and
information. It has been suggested that such information is in
high demand by government agencies and that Congress has
failed to ensure that environmental laws are supported
adequately by ecological information. 09 Litigation at the broad
planning level requires parties bringing a claim to support
that claim with broad, generally relevant research and infor-
mation, and the resource-management process benefits from
106. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
107. See Feld, supra note 15, at 146-47.
108. See id. at 144 (citing 132 CONG. REC. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (state-
ment of Rep. Berman on reasons to broaden the qui tam action)).
109. E.g., William M. Lewis, Jr., The Ecological Sciences and the Public Domain,
65 U. COLO. L. REv. 279, 279-80 (1994). Not only is "accurate and credible informa-
tion ... necessary to making wise environmental decisions, but [s]uch information
[also] must be framed in terms of ecosystems" and not in site-specific terms. John S.
Banta, Environmental Protection and Growth Management, in UNDERSTANDING
GROWTH MANAGEMENT 134, 134 (David J. Brower et al. eds., 1989).
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the information at the expense of the private parties bringing
the challenge. 110 Site-specific challenges arguably do not gen-
erate information that is broad in scope and generally rele-
vant, as the focus of such challenges is necessarily limited.
3. Common Sense-The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has raised some legitimate common sense justifications
for allowing planwide challenges.1 ' One justification is that a
"challenge to a particular, site-specific action would lose much
force once the overall plan has been approved-especially if
the challenge were premised on the view that the overall plan
grew out of erroneous assumptions.""2 One might argue that
a planwide decision should not be challenged at all, but, in
responding that it should be, it seems clear that the plan
should be challenged when it is adopted and not in the context
of a site-specific challenge.
4. The Tiering Policy for Environmental Impact
Statements-Allowing standing to challenge a general plan is
consistent with the "tiered" approach to the creation of envi-
ronmental impact statements required by federal regula-
tions." 3 The regulations encourage agencies to "tier" their
environmental impact statements such that early, broader
environmental impact statements address general questions,
allowing subsequent site-specific statements to avoid repetitive
discussion of the same issues and to focus on narrower issues
concerned." 4 The approach allows an agency to "exclude from
consideration issues already decided or not yet ripe.""5. This
suggests that, if a court considers a plan not-yet-ripe at the
planwide level, another court might consider the plan's validity
already decided by the time decision making reaches the site-
specific level. Thus, if a management plan is to be challenged,
the time for that challenge is when the plan is adopted.
5. Legislative Intent-The major statutes governing envi-
ronmental agency processes and decision making suggest that
planwide challenges are appropriate and within the contem-
plation of Congress. For example, the purpose of the NEPA is
"to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
110. See Lewis, supra note 109, at 291.
111. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
112. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992).
113. See Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1355 n.15
(9th Cir. 1994).
114. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28 (1995).
115. Id. § 1508.28.
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the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man." 16 The NEPA further provides that all agen-
cies shall "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social
sciences ... in planning and in decisionmaking which may
have an impact on man's environment."" 7 In addition, the
NEPA requires agencies to recognize the "worldwide and long-
range character of environmental problems."" 8
The Endangered Species Act is similarly broad in its focus,
providing that its purpose is "to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems on which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved."" 9 Similarly, the Forest and Range-
land Renewable Resources Planning Act recognizes that the
management of the nation's resources is "highly complex,"
requiring a comprehensive "renewable resource program." 20
Each of these statutes recognizes implicitly that the impor-
tant decisions regarding the management of the environment
are made at the general planwide level. Certainly a complaint
alleging that a planning decision was adopted without proper
consideration of its impact on the environment, or in violation
of one of the principles set forth in statutes such as these,
falls "within the zone of interests"12' to be protected by these
statutes, and, insofar as the plaintiffs are injured, they are in-
jured "within the meaning of [the] relevant statute."22
6. Ecology-As suggested above, there are ecological rea-
sons for allowing plaintiffs to challenge planwide agency
decisions. For instance, commentators have argued that the
common law property concepts underlying the traditional
approach to environmental management, with their emphasis
on abstract individual rights and the treatment of persons as
subjects and the environment as an object, are ill-suited to
their task.'23 For example, the boundary between site A and
site B, although it has a significant legal meaning, has no
meaning in nature's terms. As our understanding of the
environment has changed over the years, the view of nature
116. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
117. Id. § 4332(2)(A) (emphasis added).
118. Id. § 4332(2)(F).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
120. Id. § 1600(1), (2).
121. See Association of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970).
122. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
123. Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269,
1269-70 (1993).
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as balanced and predictable has shifted.'24 The modern view
requires that environmental management be approached as
an ongoing experiment conducted without regard to bound-
aries rather than as a series of discrete, final decisions.
125
While "[dlevelopment occurs on a project-by-project scale ...
ecosystems ... respond at larger scales, ranging from the
drainage basin to the airshed." 26 Of course, the ultimate
decision whether to sell a stand of timber for logging will
necessarily be site-specific and will involve boundaries, but
the place to bring any comprehensive, meaningful, and useful
challenge to how an agency is handling its task is at the
planwide level.
127
7. Efficiency-Because the demands for land use often
inherently stand at odds with one another-an environmental
group, for example, wanting to preserve an area that a timber
company wants to harvest-the real battle could be fought
most efficiently at the stage when the dominant use for a gen-
eral area is being defined. Just as a site-specific challenge will
lack force when the plan allowing the action has already been
approved, the challenge will be lacking even more when the
approved plan has been subject to judicial review. A plan that
has withstood judicial scrutiny could eliminate, or at least
simplify, future site-specific challenges, thereby conserving
judicial resources and perhaps reducing the total number of
claims a court must hear regarding a particular area.
8. The Floodgates Argument-Even absent standing re-
quirements, other procedural safeguards exist to minimize the
time that courts must spend considering meritless claims.
First, the APA limits the nature of the claims that a plaintiff
may bring by providing that a person is entitled to judicial
review of an agency action only if he is "suffering legal wrong
... or [is] adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
124. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the
Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1134 (1994).
125. See id. at 1134 n.57.
126. Banta, supra note 109, at 134.
127. Numerous commentators support an ecosystem-based approach to resource
management. See, e.g., Leslie A. Carlough, Integrating Ecology and Environmental
Policy, 23 ENVTL. L. 1375 (1993) (book review); Robert L. Fischman, Biological
Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435
(1992); Freyfogle, supra note 123; James P. Karp, Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic: Is an
Ecological Conscience Evolving in Land Development Law?, 19 ENVTL. L. 737 (1989);
Tarlock, supra note 124.
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within the meaning of a relevant statute."2 ' Even if one reads
"legal wrong" and "adversely affected" to be much broader
than "injury in fact," the plaintiff still must show that his
claim is recognized by a corresponding statute. Conversely, if
a statute does appear to contemplate a plaintiffs claim, how
can it be said that such a claim does not present a case or
controversy?
Even more basic are the obstacles created by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. If a plaintiff has not alleged facts
sufficient to support a claim, a court may dismiss the case.'29
A court may also dispose of a meritless case on a motion for
summary judgment. 3 ° Even the plaintiff whose claim has some
merit will have difficulty getting a court to reverse an agency
decision as the scope of review under the APA is limited,'3 ' and
the courts have shown great deference to agency decisions.
32
B. A Not-So-New Understanding of Injury
An agency planning decision that potentially subjects a
natural area to uses from which it had been protected ought
128. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
129. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
131. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (1988) (allowing a court to set aside agency action
if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious ... contrary to constitutional right ... in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations ... or without observance
of procedure").
132. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, Inc., 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971) ("[T]he ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empow-
ered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."). Also note that Idaho Con-
servation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992), Salmon River
Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994), and, in part,
Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1993), discussed above,
supra Part II.B., each found against the plaintiffs on the merits after finding that they
had standing.
Another concern raised by the standing issue is that, in reviewing agency planning
decisions, the courts will be overstepping their duties in violation of the separation
of powers doctrine. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60
(1992); Scalia, supra note 21. Some have suggested that the separation of powers is
not a legitimate concern in this arena because the cases at issue merely ask the courts
to interpret the law and decide whether or not an agency has violated it. See, e.g.,
Fletcher, supra note 75, at 233-34; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 196-97. In any event,
the constitutionality of injury in fact as a prerequisite to establish standing is beyond
the scope of this Note; this Note argues that the courts have much more latitude in
defining and interpreting injury in fact than they have taken in the context of
environmental law.
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to be accepted by the courts as an injury in fact to plaintiff
environmental groups that claim to use that area. Although
some courts have rejected this idea, and no court has accepted
it in so many words, the Supreme Court has paved the way
for such an approach in analogous contexts.
1. Bakke-type Injury-The Supreme Court decision in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,'33 lends sup-
port to the approach to standing advocated here. In Bakke,
the plaintiff challenged the special admissions program at the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis under
the Equal Protection Clause.'34 The plaintiffs alleged injury
was that he was denied admission to the medical school as a
result of the school's special admissions program, 35 which set
aside sixteen of the one hundred openings in each class for
the beneficiaries of the program. 36 The plaintiff sought a
mandatory injunction compelling his admission to the
school. 137
It is not at all clear that the plaintiff satisfied Article III
standing requirements as it has been defined in the context of
citizen environmental suits. The plaintiff did provide evidence
that his test scores and grade point average were higher than
the average scores and grade point averages of people who
were admitted under the program. 3 ' But in the two years in
which the plaintiff applied for and was denied admission,
there were a total of 2464 and 3737 applicants, respectively.
39
Thus, in the second year, for example, 3637 applicants were
denied admission, including the plaintiff, leaving 3636 appli-
cants who might have been admitted before the plaintiff even
absent the special admissions program. To demonstrate that
he was actually injured by the program, the plaintiff should
have had to show that he was in fact among the sixteen who
would have been admitted but for the program, which, the
trial court concluded, the plaintiff was unable to show. 4 ' The
Supreme Court addressed the plaintiffs standing only briefly
in a footnote and concluded that the plaintiffs "injury, apart
133. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
134. Id at 269-70.
135. Id. at 277-78.
136. Id. at 275.
137. Id. at 277.
138. Id. at 278 n.7.
139. Id. at 273 n.2.
140. Id. at 279.
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from failure to be admitted, [was] the University's decision
not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class
,,141
By analogy, an individual's interest in the chance to com-
pete for admission to medical school is like an environmental
group's interest in the chance to use a particular area of land
within a larger affected area. The injury to the plaintiff in
Bakke, as one of 3637 people denied the chance to compete for
sixteen openings, seems no more obvious, or "in fact," than the
injury to one 1,000-acre piece of land out of 3,637,000 acres
caused by a decision to deny those acres protection from
development. In fact, the latter case may present a stronger
showing of injury. In Bakke, only sixteen out of 3637 people,
or less than one-half of one percent, could possibly have been
injured "in fact." By contrast, in many reclassification deci-
sions or forest management plans, the percentage of land that
actually will eventually be affected is much greater.'42 Of
course, because the land itself cannot allege injury, plaintiffs
challenging an environmental plan must also show that they
use the affected sites and thereby show injury to them-
selves. 4 3 By the standard implied by Bakke, this requirement
should be satisfied by a showing that members of the plaintiff
group use any part of the area encompassed by a management
plan. Instead, plaintiff groups have been asked to show that
a plan will affect a specific site that members use.'44 This
would be like asking the plaintiff in Bakke to show that he
141. Id. at 281 n.14 (emphasis added).
142. It is not always clear from the opinions how much of the area affected by an
agency decision is actually likely to be logged, mined, or developed, but, for example,
in Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, the LRMP at issue recommended that 59%
of the area affected be developed. 956 F.2d 1508, 1512 n.8 (9th Cir. 1992). In Salmon
River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, the plaintiffs alleged that 6 million of 20
million acres (30%) would in fact be adversely affected. 32 F.3d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir.
1993).
143. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (stating that the
injury-in-fact test for standing requires that the "party seeking review be himself
among the injured"). Under the approach suggested by this Note, plaintiff environ-
mental organizations still would be required to show that their members use the
affected areas; they simply would not be required to prove that their members use
the specific sites that will in fact be physically affected.
144. See e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n (NWF), 497 U.S. 871, 886-87
(1990) (reversing the court of appeals and implicitly affirming the district court's
ruling that the plaintiffs had submitted inadequate affidavits, noting that the
district court found that "[there is no showing that [one plaintiffs] use and enjoy-
ment extends to the particular 4500 acres covered by the decision . . ").
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was in fact among the sixteen people who would have been
admitted but for the special admissions program.14
The standing requirements applied in Bakke are appropri-
ate and ought to be applied to cases in which plaintiffs seek to
challenge a resource management plan. 4 6 If the injury is
understood to be the loss of the opportunity to be free from
development, the other standing requirements, causation and
redressability, fall into place. To the extent that plaintiffs can
show an injury of the kind proposed here, the injury is clearly
and directly traceable to the agency action, and the injury is
sure to be redressed by a court's decision holding the action
unlawful.
2. Other Precedent-As discussed earlier, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has attempted, with varying
degrees of clarity, to articulate the approach suggested
here.'47 Similarly, Justice Blackmun's dissent in NWF implic-
itly recognized such an approach by finding the affidavits
alleging use of land in the vicinity of the affected lands suffi-
cient because "[albundant record evidence supported the . . *
assertion that on lands newly opened for mining, mining in
fact would occur."'48 Justice Blackmun apparently did not
think it was necessary for the plaintiffs to identify the specific
sites where mining would occur and then allege actual use of
those sites. This approach is grounded in common sense. Fine
distinctions and legal technicalities aside, it should not be
difficult to find that plaintiffs who regularly use an area of
once-protected wilderness that has suddenly been opened to
mining or logging have suffered an injury. This is especially
true when it is obvious that the mining or logging will in fact
occur pursuant to the new classification, and the only ques-
tion remaining is exactly where and when the activity will
occur.
The Supreme Court also has recognized less concrete inju-
ries in other contexts. In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,' 49
145. The standard for environmental groups is made even stricter by the fact that
the courts, when ruling on summary judgment motions, as opposed to motions to
dismiss, have required that plaintiffs actually prove standing rather than simply
present a genuine issue of fact. See, e.g., NWF, 497 U.S. at 902 (1990).
146. Sunstein suggested but did not develop the idea that alleging a Bakke-type
injury ought to be enough in challenging environmental agency decisions in general.
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 204-05.
147. See supra Part II.B. Recently the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has taken a similar approach. See Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
148. 497 U.S. 871, 900 (1990).
149. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
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a utility company challenged the validity of an agency decision
that exposed it to competition from other companies to which
it had not been exposed previously.150 The Court found that,
although economic injury stemming from lawful competition
could not confer standing, the fact that Congress had written
a statute reflecting a purpose to protect that competitive
interest did confer standing in an action seeking to compel
compliance with the statute.'51 The Court also has granted
standing in a case in which plaintiff tenants sued their land-
lord for discrimination under the Civil Rights Act even though
they were not the victims of discrimination.'52 The injury,
according to the Court, was that the plaintiff tenants were
deprived of the benefits of living in a racially integrated
community.'53 Both of these examples illustrate the principle
that the "injury required by Art[icle] III may exist solely by
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing."'54 Put another way, "Congress may enact
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the
statute."55
Writing for the majority in Defenders of Wildlife, Justice
Scalia attempted to distinguish the line of precedent cited
above on the grounds that the cases "involved Congress's
elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete,
de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law," as
opposed to cases where the courts are asked to "'abandon [I the
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have
suffered an injury. ' 156 Although the facts of Defenders of
Wildlife might justify such a distinction, the distinction fails
in cases like Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma 157 and
Sierra Club v. Robertson,58 in which it seems clear that Con-
gress, through statutes like the NEPA, in conjunction with the
APA, has elevated to a legally cognizable injury the concrete,
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 5-6.
152. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 206-07, 211-12
(1988).
153. Id. at 209-10.
154. Warth v. Seldin, 422 US. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
156. 504 U.S. at 578 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)).
157. 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
158. 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994); see supra Part II.
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de facto harm caused when an agency deprives a wilderness
area of protection in violation of statutory mandate.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in Defenders of Wildlife, seemed
to acknowledge the point argued here, noting:
As government programs and policies become more com-
plex and far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articu-
lation of new rights of action that do not have clear
analogs in our common-law tradition .... [Hiowever,
Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks
to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons
entitled to bring suit.' 59
In passing a statute like the NEPA, which defines the criteria
and procedures that an agency must follow before undertaking
any action that might affect the environment and that aims
"to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment," 160 Congress has identified an injury: agency
decisions that do not follow procedures designed to prevent
damage to the environment. The class of persons who ought to
be entitled to bring a suit to challenge such decisions are those
whose environment has been denied such protection, whether
the decision affects a single acre or an entire region.
CONCLUSION
Developments in the law of standing have presented unique
challenges to environmental groups seeking to challenge
agency decisions. This is especially true for plaintiffs seeking
to challenge broad planning decisions that affect the environ-
ment. Nonetheless, both the rationale supporting citizen
suits-that citizens can act as private attorneys general and
help the executive branch ensure that the laws are faithfully
carried out-as well as the practical and policy concerns
particular to environmental decisionmaking, present strong
reasons in favor of allowing these challenges. Toward that
end, the federal courts should broaden their understanding of
injury in fact to encompass an agency planning decision that
159. 504 US. at 580.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
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deprives a wilderness area of its protected status even absent
a proposed site-specific action. Such an approach would be
consistent with the Supreme Court's understanding of injury
in analogous contexts. The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits already have adopted an approach
similar to the one proposed here, but it must be expanded and
clarified; the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
adopted the opposite approach. Yet all courts claim to follow
Supreme Court precedent. Whether or not the Supreme Court
decides to resolve the issue in the near future, the idea of a
planning decision as an injury in itself may be a viable and
useful way to articulate the injury suffered in this context.
